stage the budget is exceeded, they will typically respond by retrenching expenditure in an effort to curb cost spiralling and to compensate for the existing deficit. In this tense situation compromises are often made in the project's quality. The designs are trimmed down, and functional requirements may be scrapped and/or foreseeable problems may be shifted to the operation phase.
In the academic literature many general observations have been made about weaknesses in the way that large infrastructure projects are developed. We have compiled a selection:
(1) The go/no-go decision is either nonexistent or inexplicit. There is one powerful promoter who wants a large project and who gradually manages to push it through. After a while the public authorities realise that there is no way back. This is a classic case of entrapment (Brockner and Rubin, 1985) . (2) The department responsible (usually the Ministry of Transport) soon emerges as the most forceful advocate of the project. On the one hand, this is accompanied by smart forms of public entrepreneurship (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2004) whereas, on the other, the department tries to sell this specific project to other parties and does not flinch from misinformation (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003a; 2003b) . (3) Transport performances are systematically overestimated in the early stages, whereas the investment and operating costs are systematically underestimated. Early political decisions about large infrastructure projects are often based on totally inaccurate information (Pickrell, 1992; Wachs, 1989; 1990) . (4) Large infrastructure projects are often considered in isolation. Cross-border impacts and network relations tend to be underestimated. Rail investment without accompanying policy measures, such as road charging, is likely to be costly and ineffective (Short and Kopp, 2005) . (5) The public decisionmaking on large infrastructure projects still runs too much along sectoral lines. For example, in the Dutch legislation on environmental impact assessment, there is scope for alternative solutions, but in spatial planning there is no tradition of weighing up alternatives. Aspects such as transport planning, spatial planning, safety, the environment, health, and economics are usually dealt with in isolation. (6) Often, the solution precedes the problem. A detailed problem analysis is essential when decisions need to be taken on large infrastructure projects. Moreover, alternatives are not systematically explored and worked out at an early stage (Findeisen and Quade, 1985) . (7) In the majority of cases there are no independent systematic evaluations of large infrastructure projects, but it is precisely from such evaluations that collective lessons can be learned (Vickerman, 2000) .
In this contribution, I examine the development, the design, and spatial planning of two Dutch large infrastructure projects (see figure 1) . A forerunner of this paper exists in Dutch (Priemus, 2005) . I will discuss the practical problems that arise and indicate how these problems might be prevented or resolved. I will address the following topics: (a) How the`ideal' solution is fixed upon at a very early stage, and the subsequent failure or refusal to develop and evaluate a good number of alternatives and variants. (b) The tendency to fix upon one route for the infrastructure project, and the failure or refusal to tackle the project from a regional development perspective. (c) How problems concerning the mitigation of territorial impacts of infrastructure are misjudged in the beginning, leading to cost overruns at a later stage at which little can be done about them. In general, insufficient attention is paid to a timely and considered optimization of the project scope; there is too much focus on the infrastructure track and not enough focus on area development.
(d) How the operation of the infrastructure is misjudged and how attention is too narrowly focused on the investment aspects of the project.
In sections 4 and 5 I deal with the Amsterdam^Rotterdam high-speed rail line. First, in sections 2 and 3, I present the case of the freight railway between Rotterdam and Germany: the Betuwe Line. In section 6 I specify a number of general problems in the development and design of large infrastructures, which both cases have demonstrated. Finally, in section 7, I formulate some lessons for the future, not only for the Netherlands, but also for other modern countries.
Background to the Betuwe Line
In the Netherlands of the 1980s there was a strong desire to strengthen the relationship between spatial planning and the national economy. In particular, the position of thè mainports' ö Amsterdam Schiphol Airport and Rotterdam Harbour ö was seen as being very significant. Politicians observed that Rotterdam could offer good road and waterway connections to the Dutch hinterland and beyond, but that its rail connections were less than satisfactory. This point was raised in the 1980`Cornelissen Motion' in parliament, which called for a new railway line between Dordrecht and Nijmegen (via Geldermalsen; see figure 2) to be included in the`key planning procedures' within the first Traffic and Transport Structure Plan. And so the idea of the Betuwe Line was born.
In 1983 Professors Poeth and Van Dongen were commissioned by the Rijnmond regional authority to conduct a study into the impact of new technology on Rotterdam Harbour. They called for a revitalization of goods transport by rail, and for the development of inland terminals in the Netherlands, along the main transport routes between the Rotterdam Harbour area and Germany. This, it was claimed, would strengthen the competitive position of Rotterdam Harbour against that of Antwerp and the harbours of the north German coast. In the 1985 Master Plan for the Future of Rotterdam's Harbour, Poeth and Van Dongen (1985; see also 1983) call attention to the possibility of developing the existing Betuwe Line (an underused freight railway connecting Rotterdam and Elst; see figure 2) to become a major transport route.
Such ideas were given a considerable boost in 1989 when the Minister of Transport, Neelie Smit-Kroes, appointed the Van der Plas Commission to produce a vision statement on the future of goods transport by rail. This commission took less than three months to produce its final report (Commissie Van der Plas, 1989) .
The Van der Plas Commission defined the relationship between Rotterdam and Germany as an`east^west corridor': a significant transport axis for goods which should also be given hubs for combined transport modalities (road, rail, and waterway). By 2010 this east^west corridor should be able to handle 75 million tonnes of freight each year. The Duivesteijn Commission later pointed out that the Van der Plas Commission was far from impartial, and that it gave those supporting the Rotterdam Harbour and goods transport by rail an unexpected opportunity to promote their own interests. The`Nederland Distributieland' (Netherlands: country of distribution) coalition, founded in 1987 to promote the Dutch role in international freight logistics, played an important part as a lobby group behind this plan, and even received funding from the Ministry of Transport.
Throughout this period, the problem analysis remained narrow. The prime concern was to identify opportunities for developing Rotterdam Harbour as a`mainport'. Clearly, it would greatly benefit from a high-quality rail connection with the German hinterland. Though the initial plans concerned an upgrading of the existing Betuwe Line, it was not long before the idea of an entirely new route gained favour. Much of this new route would then be combined, or`bundled', with the A15 motorway. It was felt that this approach would help rail-freight transport regain its position as a flourishing sector of the economy.
Environmental arguments were also put forward: road transport was seen as a major source of pollution, whereas the spectre of ever-increasing and eventual gridlock congestion loomed. The idea of`road pricing'öa toll payable by trucksöhad already been mooted, on the basis of the policy already adopted in other countries. This would render`clean' transport by rail or waterway more competitive. Only much later was it realized that road transport was itself becoming cleaner and that rail transport is also a major source of pollution, whereby no overall environmental gains could be expected. The idea of road pricing continued to enjoy support, although no similar tax on rail transport was ever included in the analysis. The solution was decided upon at a very early stage of the process: the new Betuwe Line, preferably with separate north and south branches, was regarded as the answer to all problems, even though the insight into the nature, extent, dynamics, and interrelationships between those problems was not particularly deep.
3 Betuwe Line alternatives
The Warnemu« nde Agreement
The decision to lay a new Betuwe Line was quickly expressed in a coloured stripe on the map. No alternatives were considered in any detail, although at a later stage öby then, too lateösome alternatives proved to be perfectly viable.
The construction of the Betuwe Line as a dedicated goods transport route was formalized by means of the Warnemu« nde Agreement, in which the Netherlands and Germany undertook to ensure that there would be a good connection between the Betuwe Line and the German rail network. The Warnemu« nde Agreement was signed on 31 August 1992 by the Dutch Minister of Transport, Hanja Maij-Weggen, and her German counterpart.
Under the agreement, the Netherlands was to undertake the following activities, subject to the national legislative procedures having been completed (for geographic references in the Netherlands see figure 2 At the time of writing this paperöfourteen years lateröit must be stated that the Dutch government has managed to keep only three of these promises: (1), (4), and (5). The northeastern branch, the southern branch and the connection with Amsterdam have not been realized.
Phasing
The first alternative which we consider is the option of phasing the Betuwe Line. The possibility of phasing the necessary investment, or deferring a substantial proportion of the investment, is suggested by Mensink (2004) as a general alternative for calculating the net cash value of the project. Phasing could also be applied to other unavoidable expenditure further to uncertain costs and returns. It was not until 1995 that the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) suggested phasing the Betuwe Line. The subproject to expand railway structure at Rotterdam Harbour was not particularly controversial and would certainly be realized. The remainder of the Betuwe Line would then be constructed only if the capacity of the existing network proved to be inadequate. However, the CPB made this proposal after the Hermans Commission had produced a report in 1995, which recommended the construction of the Betuwe Line in its entirety. National government saw little merit in the phasing proposal of the CPB.
Inland waterways
A second alternative for the Betuwe Line was to increase the capacity of inland waterway transport. This alternative was never taken seriously, because it was assumed that a combination of waterborne transport and rail transport would always be required. On 1 September 2004 the Duivesteijn Commission heard evidence from Mr C J de Vries, director of Koninklijke Schuttevaer (the national federation of inland waterway transport operators). He stated that he had considered the Betuwe Line to be superfluous when it was first suggested, and was still of that opinion.``We can reach any destination that the train can reach, with the sole exception of Italy, since barges cannot cross the Alps,'' he said.``With fifty barges, we could sail the entire Betuwe Line out of existence!'' (Proceedings of the Duivesteijn Commission: Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004a, page 109).
The Ministry of Transport, however, was so fixated with the concept of thè mainport for all modes', that it never seriously considered, let alone elaborated and budgeted, a system without a strong hinterland connection by rail, and which would rely solely on inland waterway transport or road transport. A variation on the`inland waterway' theme was proposed by the Delft University of Technology. Its`Waal Route' would carry containers on the River Waal as far as the German border, where they would be transferred to rail transport (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004a, page 112).
The`Iron Rhine'
A third alternative was a cooperative alliance between Rotterdam and Antwerp, whereby it would not be necessary to develop both the Betuwe Line and the IJzeren Rijn (`Iron Rhine') line separately, with a joint hinterland connection by rail favoured instead.
According to the Flemish researcher Vijverberg (2000, page 75):``The need for, and usefulness of, a Betuwe Line (with its Southern Branch) in addition to the Iron Rhine, must in any event be assessed in context. Harbours must learn to work together, since the current strong competition between them results in a marked overcapacity in terms of facilities.'' Rotterdam's policy, however, continued to view Antwerp as a competitor rather than as a potential partner. Belgium stepped up efforts to expand the Iron Rhine railway once it seemed likely that the Betuwe Line project would go ahead (Vijverberg, 2000, page 77 ).
The existing railway network
A fourth alternative was to use the existing railway network more intensively. The study produced by Knight Wendling (1992) assumes an already overloaded network with no potential for increasing goods transport capacity. This conclusion was later forcefully rebutted by McKinsey & Company (1994) . Dijkstra (1994) contends that several instruments can be used to increase capacity. The CPB (1995; 2004) has stated that applying additional charges for the use of the rail infrastructure would lead to significant overcapacity, whereupon the construction of the Betuwe Line would be unnecessary, at least for the time being. This approach was conspicuous by its absence during the initial stages of the decisionmaking process in the early 1990s.
Underground
A fifth alternative would be to adopt the plan suggested by Van den Hoorn and to place the entire Betuwe Line underground. This alternative was subject to brief elaboration in 1993, and was actually considered by the Van Engelshoven Steering Group (Stuurgroep Van Engelshoven, 1993) . However, the steering group decided that it would be too expensive. The minister then declared that it would be at least twentyfive years before technology would allow a bored tunnel to be dug through the soft Dutch subsoil. This statement was pure demagogy and was discredited within a very few years. However, it seems likely that Van der Hoorn grossly underestimated the costs of a bored tunnel and that this alternative would indeed eventually have proven too expensive.
Construction methods
In the early 1990s much thought and discussion were devoted to the construction of the Betuwe Line. No fewer than eleven different alternatives were put forward.
The construction methods for the Betuwe Line suggested in the early 1990s, included (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004b, page 112): (a) a`V' polder; (b) a flyover (`Betuwe Line on stilts', proposed by Grootint); (c) the Rhine Line alternative; (d) the`hollow dike' (proposed by Van Hattum and Blankevoort); (e) a`U' polder (Ballast Nedam and Rijkswaterstaat); (f ) a dredging spoil bed (Boskalis); (g) a safe-wall system (Strukton, Verstraeten); (h) the Lievense plan (semisubmerged tunnel). Each of these alternatives elaborated the construction of the Betuwe Line in a specific way, which I shall not elaborate here. It is the work of engineers who accepted the challenge of designing and engineering the new line.
Most of these suggestions are discussed in the report of the Van Engelshoven Steering Group (Stuurgroep Van Engelshoven, 1993) , submitted to the Lower House on 30 August 1993. They were seriously considered, but eventually all were deemed to be`too insubstantive' (that is,`too expensive'). The engineers elaborated all these solutions without a clear understanding of the performance specifications and the budgetary conditions.
Alternatives for mitigation of territorial impacts
In later stages various alternatives for the mitigation of territorial impacts were discussed, in the first instance by the local authorities of the province of Gelderland, and eventually by the Lower House, which held a number of debates during which further alternatives were submitted by means of parliamentary motions. It was inevitable that plans for mitigation of territorial impacts would be required, because the original concept of a straightforward (and straight) railway line took absolutely no account of the valuable rural landscapes through which it would pass. It would have been better to devote attention to the spatial and topographical assimilation of the Betuwe Line from the very beginning, as this would have enabled a more realistic estimate of the required investment.
In November 1993 the government coalition partners submitted eight parliamentary motions intended to achieve better spatial assimilation of the Betuwe Line (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004b, page 138). They related to: (a) limitation of noise nuisance to 57 dB ( 91 million); (b) limitation of nuisance in the Barendrecht area ( 125 million); (c) cut-and-cover submerged construction near Zevenaar ( 93 million); (d) a`shortcut' from Waalhaven marshalling yards to Rotterdam Harbour, avoiding residential areas ( 44 million); (e) a means to reduce the cumulative noise nuisance of A15 and Betuwe Line between Gorinchem and Tiel ( 22 million); (f) various assimilation measures near Geldermalsen ( 59 million); (g) submerged construction in the Gelderland Poort area, under and beyond the Pannerdensch Canal ( 68 million); (h) resolution of remaining obstacles to administrative consultation ( 11 million). The total costs of the Betuwe Line are estimated to be 4844 million (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004b, page 314) .
Conclusions
The reconstruction of the decisionmaking process surrounding the Betuwe Line project reveals that the focus was firmly on the solution of the straight`as-thecrow-flies' railway line, and that no unbiased comparison of worthwhile alternatives was made during the initial phases of the process. Though other construction forms and measures for mitigating territorial impacts were indeed discussed at a later stage, this does not detract from the fact that viable alternatives were never taken seriously, or were proposed far too late to add anything to the discussions. In effect, the plans were pushed through without due process.
Background to the Amsterdam^Rotterdam high-speed line
The HSL^Zuid project was planned top-down. On the basis of positive experiences with high-speed trains in Japan and France, the idea of a high-speed link (HSL) between Amsterdam and Belgium (via Rotterdam) was first mooted in 1973. In the Traffic and Transport Structure Plan of 1979 (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1979) , the government anticipated the construction of a high-speed rail link, reserving space for the line in order to avoid spatial-planning difficulties at a later date.
In 1983 the transport ministers of Belgium, West Germany, and France agreed to conduct a study into the viability of a high-speed rail link between Paris, Brussels, and Cologne. The idea was to create a connection between the French TGV and the German ICE networks. It was the Belgians who proposed the Paris^BrusselsĈ ologne^Amsterdam project, which would include an additional connection between Brussels and Amsterdam. In 1986 this idea attracted the support of the European Commission, as it was seen as appropriate to the aim of creating a cohesive panEuropean network of HSLs. The Dutch government regarded it as a matter of strategic importance that the Netherlands should be included in the European network of high-speed rail links. Experience in Japan and France had shown that the system can be run efficiently and even at a profit.
In a later stage considerable emphasis was placed on the perceived potential for replacing European flights by rapid rail connections, a strategy which seemed attractive from the environmental perspective. However, the reasoning soon proved unsound, particularly when budget airlines such as EasyJet and Ryanair began to enjoy great success, being both quicker and cheaper than any rail link. The connection of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport to the high-speed rail network then became a matter of reinforcing the feeder function for intercontinental flights. This would enhance Schiphol's position as a transport hub, but would result in negative environmental impact overall. Despite these reservations, the problem analysis was generally accepted despite its lack of depth, and broad social and political consensus was reached regarding the value of a connection of the high-speed rail network to the Netherlands, and to the Randstad conurbation.
Amsterdam^Rotterdam high-speed link alternatives
The discussions about the HSL project centred around three interrelated aspects: (1) the design speed of 300 km/h; (2) the exact route; (3) the stations to be served along that route.
In an early stage of the procedure the government selected a`preferred route' that would interconnect Amsterdam and Rotterdam directly, the line dissecting the`GreenHeart' region. This was to be an entirely new line with a design speed of 300 km/h. The figure was not an international requirement, but the choice of the Dutch government itself with a view to a`future-proof' solution with the best chance of economic success. The reasoning was that, the faster the train, the more passengers it would attract, whereupon substitution of short-haul flights would be maximized.
When the preferred route was announced, it was seen to be a flagrant breach of the spatial policy in which the Green-Heart was regarded as sacrosanct. The Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) was then in direct conflict with his colleague the Minister of Transport. When the cabinet approved the preferred route, it was clear that the Transport Minister had won the argument.
The preferred route would serve Rotterdam, Schiphol, and Amsterdam. During the relevant debates, two alternatives were championed with some vigour. The first, proposed by the Delft University of Technology, involved using the existing line (TU Delft, 1994; 1995) . The second entailed bundling the rail route with the A13 and A4 motorways, wherever possible. This idea had been developed as a private initiative by Willem Bos, an official at the Ministry of Education, who had quickly realized the shortcomings of the preferred route in its current form.
In 1988 a study was conducted to determine whether the European high-speed network could be expanded to include a line between Amsterdam and Hamburg, via Groningen. On 15 February 1988 the Director General of Traffic reported to the Minister of Transport,``with regard to the Amsterdam^Groningen^Hamburg connection, the northern provinces have already come to the conclusion that it would offer insufficient potential'' (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004c, page 20).
The HSL memorandum 1991
In 1991 the first formal government policy document on the HSL appeared: the``HSL memorandum: the Dutch section of a high speed rail link from Amsterdam to Paris via Brussels'' (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1991). The document presented four alternative plans in detail. For alternative 1 (new lines), various routes were considered: (1) route A: Nieuw^Vennep to Rotterdam, to the east of Zoetermeer; (2) route B: Nieuw^Vennep to Rotterdam, to the west of Zoetermeer; and (3) route H: Rotterdam^Belgium, to the west of Roosendaal (see figure 2) .
The cabinet decided on alternative 1 (new lines). To the south of Rotterdam, route H would be adopted, and the decision regarding the stretch to the north of Rotterdam (route A or B) was deferred. In either case, the line would run through the Green-Heart region.
The HSL memorandum 1994
The original HSL memorandum was poorly received, both in the Lower House and beyond. The VROM minister decided to commence a new key planning decision (PKB) procedure, whereupon the 1991 HSL memorandum was allowed to die a quiet death. A new HSL memorandum appeared in 1994 and consisted of no fewer than twenty-three separate reports. It considered three routes which were important in terms of negotiations with Belgium: (1) a`harbour route' from Bergen op Zoom through the Antwerp harbour region (route GH); (2) the existing line (line 12), from Roosendaal to Antwerpen via Essen (route FH); and (3) the E19 route through Breda, running parallel to the E19 and A16 motorways (route F2).
Belgium stated a preference for the first of these options, the`harbour route'. The Netherlands favoured the third route running alongside the E19. After lengthy negotiations and a significant financial contribution from the Netherlands to Belgium ( 380 million), to compensate for the extra costs to be paid by the public authorities in Belgium, the E19 route was agreed upon.
Both the Interdepartmental Commission on Strengthening the Economics Structure (ICES) and the National Commission on Town and Country Planning (RPC) advised the Dutch government to adopt the`new line' option to the north of Rotterdam. The HSL memorandum 1994 sets out four alternative routes north of Rotterdam, designated A1, B3, BBCN, and MN8. Together, A1, B3, and MN8 form the`new line' alternative.
The 1994 Coalition Agreement
The 1994 Coalition Agreement (Kok, 1994) includes the following sentence about the HSL^Zuid project:``The decision to construct the high speed link is confirmed, to include the choice of route.'' This served to formalize the choice of preferred alternative A1, even before the consultation round of the PKB procedure had taken place. This was quite remarkable given that the new VROM minister, Margreeth de Boer, opposed the preferred alternative but did not realize that it had already been announced in the coalition agreement. The TU Delft alternative,`BBLN variant', and the Bos plan (`WB3 variant') were included in the consultation round, but cannot be said to have enjoyed a fair chance of success.
The variant routes are summarized in figures 3 and 4, where the following labels have been used. A1: the alternative, preferred by the Cabinet, passing east of Zoetermeer, crossing the Green Heart; B3: a new track, passing west of Zoetermeer, also crossing the Green Heart; WB3: the Bos-variant, proposed by Willem Bos, citizen of Zoetermeerö a new track, along the A13 (Rotterdam^The Hague) and A4 (The Hague^Amsterdam) motorways, not crossing the Green Heart; BBLN: new track along the existing railway Rotterdam^The Hague^Leiden^Schiphol^Amsterdam; TU Delft variant: existing track of the railway Rotterdam^The Hague^Leiden^Schiphol^Amsterdam, upgraded to six tracks; NUL+: existing track of the railway Rotterdam^The Hague^LeidenŜ chiphol^Amsterdam (4 tracks), without enlarged capacity. Alongside the preferred route, the WB3 variant and the BBLN variant were given considerable attention during the consultation round. The`B3 variant' (which was also included in the first PKB) attracted very little support.
The considerations underlying the various route alternatives north of Rotterdam may be summarized as shown in table 1. Table 1 provides an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative, as presented to the RPC by the Minister of Transport, Annemarie Jorritsma, on 1 March 1996. This overview is far from complete. In later stages even more alternatives were proposed, but these did not play an important role in the decisionmaking processes.
Advantages and disadvantages of each alternative

5.5`Solomon's verdict' : the Green-Heart Tunnel
In the spring of 1996 it fell to the cabinet to make the next move. The Ministry of Spatial Planning was in favour of the`Bos variant', whereas the Ministry of Transport still supported the preferred route. On 14 March 1996, the day before the cabinet was due to announce its final decision on the HSL route, several special interest groups (including the Royal Dutch Touring Organization, ANWB; the Nature Preservation Society; and the Dutch Organization for Agriculture and Horticulture, LTO) called for alternatives which did not encroach upon the Green-Heart region. On 10 April 1996 Prime Minister Wim Kok suggested a tunnel running under part of the Green-Heart region as a means of achieving the preferred route and at the same time sparing the more vulnerable areas. On 3 May 1996 the cabinet finally selected the A1 alternative, with the addition of a 9 km bored tunnel from Hazerswoude to the A4. The additional costs were estimated to be in the order of 400 million. When it appeared that a majority in the Lower House intended to vote for the Bos variant, Kok exerted some informal influence and the relevant motion was withdrawn. The way was then cleared for the implementation of the preferred alternative to include the Green-Heart Tunnel.
Alternatives for mitigation of territorial impacts
The migration of territorial impacts was also a matter of considerable concern during the process. The cabinet eventually reserved an additional 653 million over and above the amount stated in the PKB part 1 to facilitate assimilation. A list of changes between the PKB part 1 plan and the final preferred route can be compiled, with a total of about 650 million additional costs. In a later stage two assimilation modifications were made: the so-called pergola construction at Hoogmade (better assimilation of HSL^Zuid and A4 highway) and the submerged track at Bergschenhoek (see figure 2) . 
Conclusions
It may be concluded that, as in the case of the Betuwe Line, the Lower House successfully intervened during the later stages of the decisionmaking process in order to introduce improved assimilation measures, but that all key decisions were nevertheless made by the cabinet in earlier stages. The HSL^Zuid decisionmaking process differed from that for the Betuwe Line process in that several route alternatives were identified and considered. By rigidly maintaining the design speed requirement of 300 km/h, and by including the preferred alternative in the 1994 Coalition Agreement, the cabinet was able to pass this choice through the political and social decisionmaking procedures without any serious problems. The Lower House was rarely apprised of all the facts (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004c) .
6 General problems in the development and design of large infrastructure projects in both cases
Introduction
In the cases both of the Betuwe Line and of the HSL^Zuid we observe the following general problems: (a) misjudgment of problems in mitigating territorial impacts; (b) neglect of operation issues; and (c) lack of creative competition.
Misjudgment of the mitigation of territorial impacts
Infrastructure projects usually start out as a simple line drawn on a mapöas in the case of the Betuwe Line, for example. Then, much later, it becomes apparent that, in order to adequately integrate the route in its physical surroundings, all sorts of special and costly constructions must be built, such as tunnels, bridges, and noise barriers. These almost unavoidably lead to large cost overruns. Construction of the route through urban areas in particular requires additional facilities and expenditure. But experience has shown that the transection of vulnerable landscapes and designated habitat and bird directive areas also demands extra attention and often expensive additional facilities. Additionally, archaeological finds must be dealt with in accordance with the Valletta Treaty and this too can consume considerable amounts of time and money. The general issue here is optimization of the scope of the project. It is rarely a good idea to design only the line infrastructure. The hubs (stations) should be integrated into the development of the project. Expected additional income (for example, higher land prices around a hub) should be reinvested in the project to offset unprofitable investments and/or to enhance the project's quality (value capturing). Among public and private developers there is growing recognition of the benefits of broader-area development over strict line-infrastructure development. Public and private financing could also be based more strongly on the principle of benefit and risk sharing (alliance contracts).
Conventional civil engineers still have difficulty regarding long-term infrastructure projects as a design problem. According to the design-and-construct model, it is the contractor who is responsible for the design. Nevertheless, there is much to be said for hiring creative designers. Not only are they well suited to making a professional design for the infrastructure itself, they will also incorporate the quality of place of the hub, and the spatial assimilation of the project. Often, the transfer quality of the hub (train, car, tram, underground, bus) will have to be reconciled with the user quality of housing offices, facilities, and public space (Bertolini and Spit, 1998) .
Special infrastructure projects should be designed in relation to other existing or new infrastructure, and not as standalone structures. There are often advantages to combining or`bundling' infrastructure (for example, road and rail). Special attention should be given to the crossing of new and existing infrastructures. Split-level crossings are popular: sometimes the new infrastructure may be higher, elsewhere it crosses a higher existing infrastructure (this was the issue of the so-called high^low package of the Betuwe Line). Bridges and tunnels are quite costly, compared with the other parts of the rail infrastructure, but they can become the characteristic highlights of the finished route.
Neglect of operation issues
Many project developers become obsessed by the investment and do not start thinking about the operation until the project is in an advanced stage. Which operation model should be applied? What is the exploitation budget? Which rules should be applied in passing on costs to users (user charge)? How do competitors exploit similar infrastructures?
What methods provide the most reliable short-term and long-term predictions of passenger and goods flows in both directions? And in the event that actual exploitation does not meet the projected expectations: who bears the risks, and how? And how can we organize commitment of the future operators, in the stage of developing and designing the infrastructure projects?
Lack of creative competition
It is important to think in terms of networks when developing large infrastructure projects. How might the scale of a large line-infrastructure project be linked up with the larger scale of the network and the smaller scale of hubs and stations? Ideally, the first step in the preparation process should be to draw up a functional programme of requirements or performance specifications (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003a, pages 115^117) . For example, points A and B must be connected, a quantitative capacity of x passengers per hour; y TEU per hour. What environmental, safety, and spatial assimilation requirements must be fulfilled? At a more general level, what public wishes does the project aim to fulfil, and which public values must be respected? Next, the most logical step would be the determination of the process architecture: the organization of a competition in which different candidates present their designs, investment budgets, and exploitation budgets. In this process of creative competition, the candidates indicate which elements can be financed privately and which risks they are able to bear themselves. In other words, who needs the lowest subsidy to realize and exploit the project in a way that meets the specified public requirements? A distinction should be made between: (a) one-off subsidies and investment risks; and (b) annually recurring subsidies and exploitation risks. The financial conditions and quality of the tenders must be compared using common parameters (for example, net cash value; differences in quality expressed in monetary terms). The candidates' tenders will be compared primarily on the basis of their value creation, rather than costs. What are the projected revenues (over a certain period) minus investment costs and annual costs? How are risks and uncertainties to be dealt with? A participating consortium should be given the opportunity to submit alternative tenders. One aspect that must be considered here is how the design-and-construct model, respectively the design, build, finance, maintain model, could be combined with the advice and public participation procedures required by law.
Lessons
There are significant differences in the way that alternatives were dealt with in the Betuwe Line and the HSL^Zuid. The Betuwe Line dossier shows that one solution had been fixed on at an early stage: other interesting alternatives were not considered or not mentioned in the first years of the project. Some of these alternatives were raised in later stages, and appeared to be sensible, but it was by that time too late to really reconsider the early solution. In the early 1990s different construction methods were proposed by engineers and contractors, however, and many spatial assimilation alternatives were discussed and realized, thanks to the provincial and local authorities and parliament. These alternatives were largely responsible for the cost overruns in the project's later stages.
By contrast, alternative routes were considered in the preparatory stages of the HSL^Zuid, but it became apparent afterwards that the alternatives to the government's preferred route were never taken seriously. Later, a limited number of spatial assimilation alternatives were introduced and created some cost overruns.
These differences aside, the decisionmaking processes for the Betuwe Line and HSL^Zuid were highly similar. For both the Betuwe Line and the HSL^Zuid, it is noticeable that the problem analysis underpinning the political decisionmaking process was very insubstantial. It would seem that the solution existed before the problem definition. In the case of the HSL^Zuid, there was clearly a top-down style of argumentation. On the basis of the positive experiences with the French high-speed rail service between Paris and Lyon, it was decided at European level that there should be a European network of high-speed rail links, including the Netherlands. This vision enjoyed broad political and social support over the years.
However, the Betuwe Line never attracted such support. The idea of constructing a new freight railway line through a valuable rural area such as the Betuwe met with fierce social resistance, and became the subject of repeated debate by the political apparatus.
The HSL^Zuid dossier includes numerous route alternatives, both to the south and to the north of Rotterdam. Agreement was reached with Belgium concerning the E19 route. The decisionmaking process on the track south of Rotterdam ran more or less as it should at this stage. North of Rotterdam, however, things were rather different. By insisting on the design speed of 300 km/h and by formalizing the preferred-route decision by means of the 1994 coalition agreement, the cabinet managed to push the route through the Green-Heart region despite fierce opposition. At the very last moment, the incorporation of a tunnel running under part of the Green-Heart region rendered it politically and socially acceptable.
The Duivesteijn inquiry revealed that the Bos variant and the variant proposed by the Delft University of Technology never really stood a fair chance.
The dossier for the Betuwe Line is even more woeful. Strategic alternatives were simply not considered during the early phases. By the time alternatives ösuch as phasing, use of the existing rail network, waterborne transport, and so on öwere indeed proposed, it was too late. Potentially worthwhile alternatives were deliberately excluded from the initiation phase, without any demur on the part of the Lower House.
Experience with the Betuwe Line and the HSL^Zuid teaches that spatial assimilation problems were always underestimated in the beginning, that exploitation issues were neglected in the development and design of the project, and that there was a lack of creative competition.
It is vitally important that a sharply formulated programme of requirements (performance specifications) lies at the core of the development and design of large infrastructural projects. The creativity of alternative consortia can be stimulated by inviting them to submit proposals meeting these performance specifications. The submission with the best qualityöprice relationship will win. This submission must be the key to a sound operation of trains. A commitment is needed from a consortium able and willing to operate the new infrastructure for a period of at least twenty to thirty years.
Right from the start attention needs to be paid to the spatial placement and the environmental, safety, and health aspects. Budgets must be based on a high-quality spatial placement and on guarantees of environmental, safety, and health aspects. Cost specifications for recently executed and more or less comparable infrastructural projects may serve as reference points.
These recommendations are valid not only for new Dutch infrastructure projects, but for projects in other modern countries as well. The analysis by Pickrell (1992) and Flyvbjerg et al (2003a; 2003b; 2004) shows that the evidence of the two Dutch cases is similar to the evidence of large infrastructure projects in other countries.
The lessons in this section are highly normative and relate to the well-known public-choice model. In an ideal world these lessons would soon be learnt. But, as is illustrated by many studies conducted by political scientists, there are also factors such as`political choice', which may deviate from academic knowledge and common sense. When the continuation or formation of a coalition is at stake, there may be a coupling of political agendas: the decision on an infrastructural project is then dependent on decisions on other topics, or the will to save the ruling coalition. Sometimes political promises have been made (prematurely): in such cases political reliability and political consistency are considered more important than changing track in a learning process. In real life, projects are conceived, born, developed, delayed, redirected, shelved, or brought to fruition as opportunities and circumstances evolve. There may well be viable alternatives to major projects which could not possibly have been thought of (for a comprehensive evaluation) at the time. All projects are susceptible to the backlash from political and economic change. This might explain why, in real life, projects follow a different course from that outlined in this paper. The observers should not be too disappointed or too critical if we fail to achieve all the aims presented above. The comprehensive planning of large infrastructure projects is by no means an easy or formulaic task.
The experiences gained from the Betuwe Line and HSL^Zuid teach us that every initiative relating to a (major) infrastructural project should begin with a full workedthrough problem analysis, with as many worthwhile alternatives as can possibly be generated. These alternatives will certainly include a more efficient use of existing infrastructure capacity and the adoption of mobility charges. Every (potentially worthwhile) alternative should be worked through in detail, and should be subjected to a calculation of costs and benefits. Only when the costs, returns, and risks of each alternative are determined can any prioritization take place and a selection be made. The generation and acknowledgement of alternatives enhances the democratic process and the quality of public decisionmaking. There are still great improvements to be made in this regard.
